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Efficient allocation of impressions to advertisers in display advertising has a significant impact on advertisers’
utility and the browsing experience of users. The problem becomes particularly challenging in the presence
of advertisers with limited budgets as this creates a complex interaction among advertisers in the optimal
impression assignment. In this paper, we study online impression allocation in display advertising with
budgeted advertisers. That is, upon arrival of each impression, cost and revenue vectors are revealed and
the impression should be assigned to an advertiser almost immediately. Without any assumption on the
distribution/arrival of impressions, we propose a framework to capture the risk to the ad network for each
possible allocation; impressions are allocated to advertisers such that the risk of ad network is minimized. In
practice, this translates to starting with an initial estimate of dual prices and updating them according to the
belief of the ad network toward the future demand and remaining budgets. We apply our algorithms to a real
data set, and we empirically show that Kullback-Leibler divergence risk measure has the best performance
in terms of revenue and balanced budget delivery.
Key words : online algorithms, linear programming, primal-dual, dynamic price update, risk minimization.
History : This paper was first submitted on July 21, 2014.
1. Introduction
Online Display Advertising, which includes text ads and banner ads, is a large, growing, dynamic
and complex market. US advertisers spent more than $17 billion on display advertising and, as they
realize the effectiveness of display ads, the advertisers are spending more advertising dollars on
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them. It is expected that display ad spending will surpass $21 billion in 2014. This would represent
44% of all digital advertising, second only to search advertising. In 2015, display advertising may
even outstrip search advertising (eMarketer.com 2014). Another aspect of the display advertising
landscape is complexity. This includes attribution models (Shao and Li 2011), competition among
ad networks for attribution (Berman 2013), sequential auctions (Weber 1981), and advertiser with
limited budgets (Goel et al. 2009).
While publishers such as the huffingtonpost.com provide a medium for advertising, ad networks
optimize ad placement on these digital ad mediums. For this purpose, ad networks track user
activities online and historical interactions between users and ads, typically via tracking pixels.
Ad networks use this information to serve users relevant advertisements and help advertisers send
their messages to the desired users.
When a user browses a webpage with an advertising slot, an impression request is sent to
the ad network. Upon arrival of the impression request, the ad network must assign it to an
advertiser (media) almost immediately. In the allocation process, the ad network retrieves historical
information about the user and calculates value (bid) of serving each media (based on the estimated
probability of a click or other action, e.g.). In the presence of budget constraints for advertisers,
allocating the impression to the advertiser with the highest value might be suboptimal. Considering
the budget of each advertiser, the impression request should be allocated to an advertiser such that
the long term revenue of the ad network is maximized.
The display advertising problem has many challenging aspects. First, budget constraints intro-
duce interdependency among advertisers. Even the offline version of the problem is NP-hard (Goel
et al. 2009). However, when the ratio of bids to budgets is small enough, an offline LP formulation
of the problem results in a (1− )-optimal solution (Bahl et al. 2007). In the last few years, many
dual-based heuristics have been developed to find near optimal solutions for the online version
of this problem (for example Agrawal et al. (2009), Devanur et al. (2011)). Second, even if all
impression requests are available in advance, solving the LP to find a (1− )-optimal solution is not
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computationally practical. Large ad networks serve billions of impressions per day and currently
there is no LP solver than can handle such a large problem in the time allotted. The allocation
algorithm should be very fast, highly scalable and robust to outliers.
The third challenge is the unpredictable and unstructured nature of impression arrivals. The
stream of impression requests is not stationary and doesn’t follow any predefined pattern. For
example, an unpredictable breaking news story could flood the ad network with impression requests
from news websites. Finally, because of the technological challenges as well as the attribution
model being used, the value of a particular allocation (and associated budget consumption) can be
observed only with some delay.
In the display advertising allocation problem, there are N advertisers each with budget bi,
i= 1,2, . . . ,N , and there are M impressions that should be served. Impressions arrive sequentially
and upon arrival they must be assigned to an advertiser. The value of assigning impression j to
advertiser i is rji and this would consume aji of the i-th advertiser’s budget. The objective is to
maximize the total value of the allocation without violating any budget constraint.
If one had all the impressions beforehand, the display advertising problem could be formulated
as a mixed integer linear programming. Let xj = (xj1, xj2, . . . , xjN) be the variable that represents
allocation of the j-th impression, i.e., xji = 1 if j-th impression is assigned to the i-th advertiser
and xji = 0 otherwise. We can find the optimal impression allocation by solving the following
maximization problem:
max
M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
rjixji (1)
s.t.
M∑
j=1
ajixji ≤ bi ∀i
N∑
i=1
xji ≤ 1 ∀j, xji ∈ {0,1} ∀(j, i).
Here, M is total number of impressions. In the rest of paper, we denote vectors of revenues and
costs by rj = (rj1, rj2, . . . , rjN) and aj = (aj1, aj2, . . . , ajN), respectively. We can relax the constraint
xji ∈ {0,1} to xji ≥ 0 and turn this into a linear programming problem.
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The dual of the linear program would be
min
M∑
j=1
pˆj +
N∑
i=1
bipi (2)
s.t. pˆj + ajipi ≥ rji ← xji ∀(j, i),
pi ≥ 0 ∀i,
pˆj ≥ 0 ∀j.
One simple observation is that, for every j at optimality,
pˆj = max
i
{rji− ajipi}.
Thus, once optimal dual pi’s are found, optimal pˆj can be constructed sequentially.
A practical, viable solution to the online display advertising problem should allocate the arriving
impressions to advertisers almost immediately. When a user visits a particular website containing an
advertisement slot, an impression request is sent to the Adserver. The Adserver should respond in
less than 5 milliseconds. Thus, a computationally complex algorithm that can’t meet 5 milliseconds
constraint is not practical.
The online resource allocation problem of (1) has been studied under several assumptions on
revenue and cost vectors (rj, aj). These assumptions can be divided into four main categories.
• Adversarial model: At each time step, an adversarial agent chooses rj and aj (Mehta et al.
2005, Aggarwal et al. 2011, Devanur et al. 2013, Karp et al. 1990).
• Random permutation model: rj and aj are fixed at the beginning and arrive according to a
random permutation (Agrawal et al. 2009, Devanur and Hayes 2009, Mahdian 2011, Karande et al.
2011, Goel and Mehta 2008, Bhalgat et al. 2012).
• Unknown iid distribution: rj and aj are independently sampled from an unknown distribution
(Devanur et al. 2011, Balseiro et al. 2012, Ghosh et al. 2009, Devanur et al. 2012).
• Known iid distribution: rj and aj are independently sampled from a known distribution (Feld-
man et al. 2009b, Jaillet and Lu 2012, Alaei et al. 2012, Manshadi et al. 2012).
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Figure 1 Number of nonzero bids for three advertisers during an hour. Bids and user types can change by time.
The adversarial model is too restrictive and usually imposes unnecessary constraints on the
problem. Since an adversarial model is a worst cases analysis, one does not expect a near optimal
algorithm (Mehta et al. 2005). On the other hand, the last three models: random permutation,
unknown iid distribution and especially known iid distribution, may assume too much structure
about the problem. In practice, the cost and revenue vectors don’t arrive in adversarial nor uniform
manner. Figure (1) shows number of nonzero bids of three advertisers in one hour (9am-10am
PST). The advertiser associated with the left plot (advertiser 1) would have more opportunities as
we get closer to the end of the hour. This might be due to the time of day pattern of the Internet
users. However, in the same hour, advertisers associated with the middle and right plot of Figure
(1) have different opportunity (demand) patterns.
Any reasonable estimation of dual prices associated to Problem (1) can be useful in guiding online
allocation. Consider the following small version of Problem (1) using only -fraction of impressions.
max
·M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
rjixji (3)
s.t.
·M∑
j=1
ajixji ≤ bi , i= 1,2, . . . ,N,
N∑
i=1
xji ≤ 1, j = 1,2, . . . ,  ·M,xji ∈ {0,1} ∀(j, i).
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Note that we used -fraction of impressions, and thus budgets should be scaled down accordingly
to some bi ≤ bi for all i. The dual of the sample linear program would be
min
·M∑
j=1
pˆj +
N∑
i=1
bipi (4)
s.t. pˆj + ajipi ≥ rji← xji ∀(j, i),
pi ≥ 0, i= 1,2, . . . ,N,
pˆj ≥ 0, j = 1,2, . . . ,  ·M.
Let pi , i= 1, ...,N , be optimal dual prices of the sample linear program. Then, the online allo-
cation for the rest of the impressions, say j, becomes: if maxi{rji−ajipi} ≤ 0 then xji = 0 for all i;
otherwise select one i∗ = arg max{maxi{rji− ajipi}} and set xji∗ = 1.
Let γ denote the maximum ratio of budget consumed by impressions to the total budget, i.e.,
γ = max
j,i
aji
bi
.
Under the random permutation model, Devanur and Hayes (2009) and Agrawal et al. (2009)
show if set bi = (1− )bi for all i and γ ≤O
(
3
N log(M/)
)
, such an online allocation algorithm, on
expectation, achieves 1 − O() fraction of the offline optimal revenue. Moreover, Agrawal et al.
(2009) show if the sample optimal dual prices are updated in subsequent doubling intervals, the
condition on γ can be loosened to γ ≤O
(
2
N log(M/)
)
.
As mentioned earlier, the random permutation model may not be realistic in practice. Further-
more, the dual prices used in these online allocations are not updated later to reflect the remaining
budgets. In this paper, we use the sample linear program optimal dual prices as initial prices and
propose simple price updating rules that incorporate belief of the ad network regarding the future
demand and remaining budgets. To appropriately model the uncertainty of future demand, we
formulate the resource allocation problem (1) as a risk minimization problem. At each step, there
are uncertainties about the future impression requests, thus, keeping or consuming any resource
(budget) would expose us to some risk. In other words, if we keep a resource and do not consume
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it now, demand for that resource might be very low in the future. Conversely, if we allocate an
impression to an advertiser and consume its budget, there might be a high demand for its budget
in the future and we lose the opportunity to serve impressions later with higher gain. Thus, upon
arrival of each impression request, it is assigned to an advertiser such that the risk of both under
and over budget consumption is minimized. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
Resource Allocation as a Risk Minimization Problem: Without assuming any particular
structure on arrival of impression requests, we pose the underlying resource allocation problem
as a convex risk minimization model problem. The ad network has an initial belief about the
future demand and this initial belief is updated as new requests are observed. Using a robust
representation of convex risk measures, we show that each distance function in a measurable space
of possible outcomes translates to an allocation algorithm.
Risk Minimization Algorithm: We show that for each arrival impression, the convex risk
minimization model can be solved in a close form so that the allocation can be decided very
efficiently. Thus, our risk minimization model is tractable for practical real time allocations.
Performance on a Real Dataset: We use real advertisers and impression requests from
AOL/Advertising.com to validate the effective performance of our model/algorithm. Among the
proposed distance functions, we show that Kullback- Leibler divergence risk measure results in the
highest revenue.
Frequency Capping: Typically, advertisers limit the number of times a particular ad can be
served to a particular user over some time frame. For example, they require the ad network to show
at most one ad per hour to a user. Incorporating these constraints would significantly increase the
computational complexity of the LP in the initial phase. We introduce a relaxation to the original
frequency capped LP that extremely reduces the size of the problem.
Before presenting the outline of the paper, let’s remove the ambiguity in four terms that are
used throughout the paper. We use the following group of words interchangeably: (1) Impres-
sion request, impression, demand, (2) Advertiser, campaign, media, (3) Bid, impression value, (4)
Budget, resource.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work and literature review is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 details the risk measure minimization framework for resource allocation.
In Section 4, we pose the display advertising problem as a convex risk minimization problem.
Then, we study robust representation of the risk measure and build a bridge between the space
of value functions over budgets and the space of penalty functions over probability measures on
possible future outcomes. In Section 5, we show allocation based on risk minimization has a simple
closed form solution and can be quickly computed by ad servers. Finally, results of the allocation
algorithms on real data are presented in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In an original paper, Mehta et al. (2005) introduced the adwords problem and proposed two alloca-
tion algorithms that are based on RANKING and BALANCED algorithms for the online matching
problem. The two algorithms have competitive ratios of 1−1/e which is the theoretical performance
bound for the adversarial model. Thus, the algorithms are optimal under the adversarial model.
Later, motivated by the display advertising allocation, Feldman et al. (2009a) studied the matching
problem under the free disposal assumption. In their model, it is possible to assign more than the
desired impressions to the advertisers, and excessive impressions are ignored. They introduced a
primal-dual algorithm with exponential updates. The proposed algorithm is (1− 1/e)-competitive
which is again theoretically tight under the adversarial model.
Our work is closely related to the work by Devanur and Hayes (2009) on online algorithms for
the adwords problem and Agrawal et al. (2009) for general resource allocation problems, both
under the random permutation model. We described their results in the previous section, which
uses the optimal dual price of each budget constraint of a sampled linear program. In particular,
Agrawal et al. (2009) proved that if the dual prices are updated in subsequent doubling intervals,
the condition to achieve (1− )-competitive ratio can be relaxed to γ ≤O
(
2
N log(M/)
)
, where γ is
the bid to budget ratio defined early. Furthermore, by constructing an example, they showed that
any (1− )-competitive online algorithm needs γ ≤O
(
2
logN
)
. One can see there is a gap between
the sufficient and necessary conditions on γ.
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More recently, using the primal solution, Kesselheim et al. (2013) closed the gap. Upon arrival of a
demand (impression) j, the primal sample linear program, including all early demand information,
of the original one is solved. Then, the allocation of the newly arrived impression is decided by a
randomized rounding of the primal solution value xji. This algorithm achieves a (1−)-competitive
solution when γ is upper bounded by O
(
2
logd
)
; where d is the column sparsity of the demands and
equals to N in the worst case. In display advertising with millions of impressions, solving a linear
program in each stage can soon becomes a bottleneck. Thus, even though their algorithm touches
the optimal bound for γ, it may not be practical in display advertising, which requires an almost
spontaneous allocation.
Also in another closely related work, Devanur et al. (2011) turned to the unknown i.i.d model
for inputs, and improved the initial performance bound. They developed heuristic allocation algo-
rithms for online mixed covering-packing and general online resource allocation problems. Taking
advantage of the stronger assumed mathematical model, they showed that their resource allocation
algorithm is (1− )-competitive if γ is at most O
(
2
log(N/)
)
. Consequently, limiting the focus to the
adwords problem, Devanur et al. (2012) introduced an asymptotically optimal allocation algorithm
under the unknown i.i.d. model.
Ciocan and Farias (2012) proposed a dual-based algorithm for the display advertising allocation
under high dimensional demand model. They assumed each impression has d possible features (such
as geo, gender,...) that characterize the value of the impression for advertisers. Each advertiser is
only interested in a subset of impressions with some specific properties, for example, an advertiser
might only be interested in showing ads to male users in California. Advertisers have the same value
for all impressions in their target group. Since targets of advertisers can overlap, when the demand
dimension d is large, predicting demand (impression) for each advertiser would be intractable.
Assuming impressions arrive i.i.d. from an unknown distribution, they showed their algorithm is
(1− )-optimal for small enough bids.
Bhalgat et al. (2012) focused on the smoothness of delivery, which is critical in display advertising.
Specifically, they partitioned the flight of the algorithm into many intervals, and then, appropriate
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constraints were added to the problem to enforce smooth delivery. Using the LP formulation, they
developed a primal-dual algorithm and proved performance of the algorithm is tight under the
adversarial model. What uniquely distinguishes this work from others is applying the algorithm to
a real data set from DoubleClick. They tested the proposed algorithms on 10 data sets and they
observed that the performance of an algorithm can be significantly different across different data
sets.
As described earlier, upon arrival of each impression request, the online allocation algorithm
developed in the current paper quickly solves a risk minimization problem for the allocation deci-
sion. Thus, we essentially update the prices of budgets on each arrival. From this perspective, our
work is also closely related to the research line of the prediction market design for contingent claims;
see Agrawal et al. (2011). Even though prediction markets are designed to aggregate information
of the traders, from the market maker’s point of view, it is basically a risk minimization problem.
The market maker has an initial belief about the event of interest, and claims arrive sequentially.
Upon arrival of the claim, the market maker allocates the claim such that the exposed future risk
is minimized. And consequently, the market maker’s belief (price) is updated. One can think of
online resource allocation as an information market, and the market maker (ad network) has an
initial belief (price) about the future demand. At each step, a demand vector (impression) arrives
and it should be assigned such that the risk is minimized.
The display advertising problem and the adwords problem are studied in other contexts which
are not the focus of this work. For example, this problem can be studied as a second price auction
which is particularly important with the rise of ad exchanges (like DoubleClick). Sequence of second
price auctions is not truthful and strategic behavior might arise (Charles et al. 2013, Leme et al.
2012, Iyer et al. 2011). The display advertising problem is also studied under the assumption of
uncertain information (Mahdian et al. 2012) and unknown/volatile demand (Ciocan and Farias
2012).
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3. Risk Minimization for Display Advertising
In this section, we first define the concept of risk measure in resource allocation. This is, we define a
function that assigns a monetary risk value to each state in the process of online resource allocation.
Later, in Section 3.2, this concept becomes the foundation for the allocation and price updating
rules. For more details on risk measure please see Fo¨llmera and Schied (2002).
3.1. Risk Measure Framework for Display Advertising
In order to formally define the risk of a random return, let measurable space (Ω,F) be the set of
possible scenarios, and X be the set of all bounded measurable functions on (Ω,F).
X = {X : Ω→ IR |X is bounded measurable functions on(Ω,F)}.
Functional X ∈ X represents the return of the position, i.e., X(p) is the return of the position
if scenario p ∈ Ω happens. A measure of risk over X is a function that assigns a real-valued (or
infinity) risk to each return function X ∈X .
Definition 1. (Fo¨llmera and Knispel 2013) A risk measure is a function ρ :X → IR∪{+∞} with
the following properties.
• Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y then ρ(X)≥ ρ(Y ).
• Translation Invariance: For any m∈ IR, ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m.
These are natural properties that one might expect from a risk measure. If under any scenario,
position Y has a higher return than position X, i.e., ∀p∈Ω,X(p)≤ Y (p), then the risk associated
to X should be smaller than the risk of Y (monotonicity property). Note that risk measure ρ(X) is
the monetary risk for holding the position X. Thus, if a real value m is added to X, i.e., return of
the position is increased by a constant value m for all the scenarios, then the exposed risk should
be reduced by m (translation invariance).
Consider the state where we have served h − 1 impressions and the h-th impression arrives.
This position can be described by S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sN); where w is the revenue that has already
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been collected (sum of rji for the allocated impressions), and si is the remaining budget of the
i-th advertiser. At each stage, we are uncertain about the future demands for available budgets
si, i= 1,2, . . . ,N . Or, equivalently, we are uncertain about the future price of each resource pi. In
the rest of the paper, we assume a measurable space (Ω,F) which is equipped with the Lebesgue
measure (P ); Ω denotes the set of all possible prices Ω = {p|p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN),0 ≤ pi ≤ pmax},
and Q denotes the set of all probability measures on (Ω,F) which are absolutely continuous with
respect to P .
Let XS : Ω→ IR be the random variable that represents the value of the position S, i.e., for
a given position S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sN), XS is a real-valued function on possible scenarios (prices)
p ∈Ω that states the return of the position. If price p is realized for the resources, then value of
the i-th resource would be pisi. Thus, the total return would be
XS(p) =w+
N∑
i=1
pisi.
We denote the set of all such functions by Xˆ (⊂X ).
Xˆ = {XS : Ω→ IR| S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sN),0≤ si ≤ bi,w≥ 0},
As we alluded to before, the risk measure assigns a real number (or infinity) to each position S.
From the definition of the risk measure, it should decrease linearly with the available cash (collected
revenue w) and should also be decreasing with respect to the available budgets si. In this paper,
for X ∈X , we study the class of the risk measures in the following form.
ρ(X) = inf
X≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS), (5)
in which
θ(XS) =−w−
N∑
i=1
vi(si). (6)
In the above definition, vi(si) ∈ C1 is an increasing function with continuous derivative. For the
consistency of the definition, we assume ∂vi
∂s
(si)≤ pmax; for more details see Lemma 6 in Appendix
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A. We will show in Lemma 2, for XS ∈ Xˆ , the risk measure in (5) coincides with the generating
function θ(.). In other words, the risk measure ρ(.) is the natural extension of θ(.) from Xˆ to X .
We start by showing that function ρ(.), as it is defined in (5), satisfies conditions of a risk measure
in Definition 1.
Lemma 1. Function ρ : Ω→ IR∪{+∞} defined in equation (5) is a risk measure.
Proof We should establish the monotonicity and the transition invariant properties for the real
valued function ρ(.). The monotonicity property is clear from the definition (5). The transition
invariance property can be shown as follows.
ρ(X +m) = inf
X≥XS−m,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS) (7)
= inf
X≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS +m) (8)
= inf
X≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS)−m. (9)
Equation (9) is based on the observation that if S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sN) and S
′ = (w +
m,s1, s2, . . . , sN), then XS +m=XS′ , and consequently θ(XS +m) = θ(XS)−m. Q.E.D.
While a risk measure should be defined over all possible return functions X ∈X , in the course of
the allocation algorithm, we only encounter functionals XS ∈ Xˆ . In the next lemma, we characterize
risk measure ρ(.) for return functions XS ∈ Xˆ which corresponds to a position S.
Lemma 2. In the impression allocation problem, for a given position S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sN), the
risk measure (5) has a closed form representation as follows.
ρ(XS) =−w−
N∑
i=1
vi(si).
Proof For XS ∈ Xˆ ,
ρ(XS) = inf
XS≥XS¯ ,XS¯∈Xˆ
θ(XS¯)≤ θ(XS) =−w−
N∑
i=1
vi(si). (10)
On the other hand, assume XS¯ is a position such that XS ≥XS¯. By Lemma 6 in Appendix A
θ(XS¯)≥ θ(XS). (11)
Shamsi et al.: Online Allocation Rules in Display Advertising
14 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!)
Because equation (11) is valid for any XS¯(≤XS),
inf
XS≥XS¯ ,XS¯∈Xˆ
θ(XS¯)≥ θ(XS) =−w−
N∑
i=1
vi(si). (12)
Finally, the lemma follows from equations (10) and (12). Q.E.D.
Having precisely defined the notion of risk in the display advertising problem, upon arrival of
an impression, we can assign the impression to an advertiser such that the future risk is mini-
mized. In the next section, we introduce an online resource allocation algorithm based on the risk
minimization.
3.2. Risk Minimization Formulation
When an impression arrives, it can be assigned to any advertiser whose budget has not been
exhausted yet. Each possible assignment would result in a different state, and subsequently a
different risk. For an appropriately defined risk measure, we can allocate the impression such that
the future risk is minimized.
Consider the position Sh−1 = (wh−1, sh−11 , s
h−1
2 , . . . , s
h−1
N ) just before the h-th impression arrives.
As detailed in the previous section, the risk associated to this position can be calculated by
ρ(XSh−1). Now, if we assign the h-th impression to the iˆ-th advertiser, the new position would be
Sh = (wh−1 + rhiˆ, s
h−1
1 , s
h−1
2 , . . . , s
h−1
iˆ−1 , s
h−1
iˆ
− ahiˆ, sh−1iˆ+1 , . . . , sh−1N ),
and consequently the risk would be ρ(XSh).
To define XSh more precisely, let bh−1i be the exhausted budget of the i-th advertiser right before
the h-th impression arrives, i.e.,
bh−1i =
h−1∑
j=1
ajixˆji,
in which xˆji is one if impression j was allocated to the i-th advertiser and zero otherwise. XSh is
the set of random variables XSh such that the corresponding position S = (w,s1, s2, . . . , sn) satisfies
the following feasibility conditions.
w=wh−1 +
∑
i
rhixhi
Shamsi et al.: Online Allocation Rules in Display Advertising
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bh−1i + ahixhi + si = bi∑
i
xhi ≤ 1
xhi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0.
Therefore, in order to minimize the risk of the resulting position, the impression should be
allocated to an advertiser by solving the following optimization:
max
∑
i
rhixhi +
∑
i
vi(si) (13)
s.t. bh−1i + ahixhi + si = bi∑
i
xhi ≤ 1
xhi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0;
where value function vi(.) of the remaining budget is described in (6) of the previous section.
Whenever an impression arrives, we solve minimization (13) to determine to which advertiser
the impression should be allocated. As we discussed in Section 1, upon arrival of the impression, it
should be assigned to an advertiser almost immediately. Later in Section 5, we show the optimal
solution in (13) has a closed form solution and it can be calculated efficiently. Furthermore, note
that each value function vi(.) induces an allocation algorithm. In the next section, we use the
robust representation of the risk measure to relate the auctioneer’s belief of the future demand to
the choice of the budget value function vi(.). In other words, the auctioneer (ad network) would
choose a budget value function based on his or her belief regarding the uncertainty in the future.
4. Convex Risk Measure and Robust Representation
Introduction of a convex risk measure in the context of ad allocation is the key step for building
a link between the auctioneer’s belief (of the future demands) and the budget value function vi(.)
in equation (5). Later in Section 5, we show a belief in the future distribution of impressions is
translated to a price updating rule in the allocation algorithm.
A convex risk measure, as defined below, has a robust (dual) representation that provides valuable
insights to the corresponding risk measure. In this section, we first define the notion of convexity
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for a risk measure, and then the robust representation of a risk measure is introduced. Next, we
find this representation for the class of risk measures that are introduced in Section 3.
Definition 2. (Fo¨llmera and Knispel 2013) A risk measure ρ(.) is called convex if it satisfies the
following convexity condition.
∀λ∈ [0,1], ρ(λX + (1−λ)Y )≤ λρ(X) + (1−λ)ρ(Y ).
The convexity condition intuitively means that the risk of two positions combined should be less
than combination of individual risks, i.e., diversification decreases the risk.
Lemma 3. If the budget value functions vi(.) are concave and increasing then the class of risk
measures defined in (5) are convex.
Proof First, note that since vi(.) are concave and increasing then, by definition, θ(.) is a convex
and decreasing function.
Let X,Y ∈X be two return functions. By definition of the risk measure ρ(.), for each 1, 2 > 0,
there exist XS1 ,XS2 ∈ Xˆ such that
X ≥XS1 , Y ≥XS2
ρ(X) = inf
X≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS)≥ θ(XS1)− 1
ρ(Y ) = inf
Y≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS)≥ θ(XS2)− 2.
Therefore,
λρ(X) + (1−λ)ρ(Y )
= λ inf
X≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS) + (1−λ) inf
Y≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS)
≥ λθ(XS1)− 1 + (1−λ)θ(XS2)− 2
≥ θ(λXS1 + (1−λ)XS2)− 1− 2
≥ inf
λX+(1−λ)Y≥XS ,XS∈Xˆ
θ(XS)− 1− 2
= ρ(λX + (1−λ)Y )− 1− 2. (14)
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In the above equations, line 3 to 4 is due to the convexity of θ(.), and line 4 to 5 follows from the
fact that λXS1 + (1− λ)XS2 ∈ Xˆ . Since equation (14) is valid for every 1, 2 > 0, the convexity
property follows. Q.E.D.
In Lemma 3, we showed that the risk measure ρ(.) is convex. Next, for a given family of prob-
ability measures Q on possible scenarios Ω, we prove that the risk measure ρ(.) has a robust
(dual) representation (Fo¨llmera and Schied 2002, Fo¨llmera and Knispel 2013). Intuitively, the risk
measure of a return function X would be interpreted as the maximum loss under any probability
measure on (Ω,F), however, there would be a penalty α(Q) associated to each probability measures
Q ∈Q. Penalty function α(Q) represents our belief toward the probability measure. Equivalently,
the risk measure can be defined based on the penalty function on probability measures. Robust
representation is one of the most powerful properties of a convex risk measure and it provides deep
insights to the underlying risk measure.
Lemma 4. Let Q be a set of probability measures on (Ω,F). If value functions vi(.) are continuous,
then risk measure ρ(.) in (5) can be represented by a probability measure penalty function (in short,
probability penalty) α(.).
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈Q
(
EQ[−X]−α(Q)
)
, (15)
where
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
(
EQ[−X]− ρ(X)
)
. (16)
Proof A convex risk measure has a robust representation (15) if it is almost surely continuous
from above (see Theorem 4.30 in Fo¨llmera and Schied (2004)). That is,
Xn↘X =⇒ ρ(Xn)↗ ρ(X).
Details of the proof can be found in Appendix B. Q.E.D.
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In the robust representation, risk of a random variable X is equal to the maximum expected loss
under the probability measure Q, EQ[−X], with penalty function α(Q) for choosing Q.
In the next lemma, we characterize the penalty function α(Q) for the class of risk measures ρ(.)
defined in (5). Note that, in equation (16), the supremum is taken over all X ∈X which includes
all real-valued bounded functions on Ω. While for a generic risk measure and function space X ,
we cannot further simplify the representation of α(.), in the impression allocation problem, the
penalty function α(.) has a much simpler form.
Lemma 5. Let Q∈Q be a probability measure on (Ω,F). Then, probability penalty function α(Q)
can be restated by taking suppremum over Xˆ as follows.
α(Q) = sup
XS∈Xˆ
N∑
i=1
(
vi(si)− p∗i si
)
(17)
where
p∗i =
∑
p∈P
Q(p)pi.
Proof Appendix C.
In the resource allocation problem, Q is a probability measure on the possible future resource
prices (or equivalently, the demand for the remaining budgets si). Thus, p
∗
i is the expected dual
price for the i-th advertiser assuming probability measure Q for future demand.
Note that each probability penalty function α(Q) is associated to a budget value function vi(.).
In what follows, we consider four budget value functions and find their representations in term of
the probability penalty function.
Zero Value Function: If we choose the budget value function to be zero, vi(si) = 0 for all i,
that is, future opportunities for spending the budgets are ignored, and only the immediate revenue,
w, is valued.
ρ(XS) = −w. (18)
While budget constraints are not violated, each impression is allocated to the advertiser with the
highest value (bid). Choosing zero value function reduces the allocation algorithm to the greedy
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Figure 2 Comparing two functions : |x|+ (used in linear budget value function) and |x|λ (used in logarithmic
budget value function).
allocation and α(Q) = 0. When α(Q) is zero, we are not penalizing any probability measure, and
we consider the worse case for evaluating the future opportunities. The performance of greedy
allocation is widely studied in the literature (Mahdian 2011, Karande et al. 2011, Mehta et al.
2005).
As mentioned earlier, advertisers often require their budget to be spent smoothly through the
flight of the campaign. The greedy algorithm not only doesn’t compensate for the future demands,
it would exhaust budgets of advertisers non-uniformly. Typically, at the beginning, advertisers
with high valuations (bids) would get most of the impressions until they are out of budget. Then,
impressions would be allocated to advertisers with lower bids.
Linear Value Function: Let pi be an estimate of resource prices in the future. For example,
pi can be the dual price of the i-advertiser’s budget from the sample linear program based on
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previously observed impressions. The budget value function can be defined as vi(si) = p

isi for all
i, and, therefore,
ρ(XS) = −w−
N∑
i=1
pisi. (19)
By Lemma 5, α(Q) is
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
N∑
i=1
(
vi(si)− p∗i si
)
= sup
X∈X
N∑
i=1
(
pisi− p∗i si
)
= ‖p.b−p∗.b‖+. (20)
Note that dot operation (.) in both p.b and p∗.b is component-wise vector multiplication, and
‖.‖+ is the norm-one of the positive components.
‖x‖=
∑
|xi|+,
where
|x|+ =

x if x≥ 0;
0 if x< 0.
Intuitively, if the estimated price pi is less than the expected i-th price from the probability measure,
p∗i , we have underestimated the value of the resource si, i.e., if probability measure Q explains the
future demand, the final revenue would be higher than pisi. Hence, expected revenue EQ[−X] is
not penalized for this resource. On the other hand, if the estimated price pi is greater than the
expected i-th price, p∗i , then our estimation for the collected revenue from the i-th resource is larger
than what we would collect under Q. Thus, EQ[−X] is penalized linearly.
The above two budget value functions are static in the sense that, while budget constraints
are satisfied, the allocation algorithm doesn’t depend on the remaining budgets of advertisers. In
other words, a small error in the initial estimation of the dual prices can propagate and lead to
unbalanced budget consumption. In the next two algorithms, we choose budget value functions
vi(s) such that the allocation algorithm is dynamically adjusted, i.e., if the budget of a particular
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advertiser is being exhausted faster than it should be spent, the algorithm reacts to the situation
by reducing the number of impressions allocated to the advertiser.
Log Value Function: Again, assume pi is an estimate of resource prices. In the case of the
linear value function, the budget of the i-th advertiser would be spent much faster when pi is
smaller than the realized price of the i-th resource. Our goal is to dynamically adjust the allocation
algorithm in case of overspending, and this can be achieved by appending the budget value function
with a logarithmic term.
vi(si) = p

isi + γ log
(
si
bi
)
, i= 1, . . . ,N. (21)
In this value function, γ is a regularization factor that can be used to tune the algorithm. In practice,
we can add a small constant value to the term inside log(.) in order to bound the derivative of
vi(.) and enforce
∂vi
∂s
(s)≤ pmax. For the log value function above, the probability penalty function
α(Q) is (see Appendix D)
α(Q) = ‖p.b−p∗.b‖γ ,
where
‖x‖γ =
∑
|xi|γ ,
and
|x|γ =

x if x≥−γ;
−γ+ γ log
(
γ
−x
)
if x<−γ.
(22)
The log value function is similar to the linear value function when pi − p∗i ≥ 0; the probability
measure is linearly penalized by pi − p∗i . However, we negatively penalize (reward) probability
measures in which p∗i is greater than the estimated price p

i . In other words, we are more confident
about the probability measures implying that our initial estimates for the prices pi are smaller
than what would be realized. Figure 2 compares two functions ‖x‖+ (used in linear value function)
and ‖x‖λ for λ= 0.1. While the functions coincide for x≥ 0, they behave differently in the negative
regime.
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This resulting algorithm heavily penalizes advertisers with small remaining budgets si. As the
available budget si approaches zero, the value function vi(si) approaches negative infinity. Thus, we
tend to avoid allocating impressions to advertisers with small remaining budgets. In other words,
the algorithm focuses on conserving budgets and allocating impressions to advertisers with higher
available resources.
Exponential Value Function: Another approach is to use an exponential function to dynam-
ically update the estimated dual prices. When the algorithm is overspending the budget of a
particular advertiser, the initial estimate of the dual price is increased and, conversely, the initial
estimate of the dual price is decreased in the case of underspending. The exponential budget value
function is defined as follows.
vi(si) = p

i
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
, i= 1, . . . ,N, (23)
where κ> 0 is a regularizing parameter. In the exponential value function, (bi−si)/bi is the fraction
of the exhausted budget after the allocation and h/N is the fraction of allocated impressions. For
κ> 0, if the fraction of used budget, (bi−si)/bi, is more than the fraction of allocated impressions,
h/N , the value function vi(.) would be small. Consequently, less impressions would be allocated to
these advertisers.
For the exponential budget value function, the penalty for the probability measure Q is a function
of two quantities: (a) KL-divergence between p.b and p∗.b, and (b) fraction of total unserved
impressions 1− h
N
(see Appendix E).
α(Q) =
(
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi
)(
−
(
1− h
N
)
+
1
κ
(
DKL (p.b‖p∗.b)− 1
))
.
Note that, in computing KL-divergence, we require p.b and p∗.b to be normalized. As we will
show in Section 6, among all the introduced allocation algorithms, this algorithm has the best
balance between maximizing the immediate revenue and conserving budgets for future impressions.
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5. Updating Dual Prices with Risk Minimization
In Section 3, we described the risk minimization framework for the impression allocation problem.
In practice, an adserver receives tens of thousands of impression requests per second, and the
assignment should happen almost immediately, typically in less than 5 milliseconds. Thus, the
allocation algorithm should be computationally inexpensive. In this section, we show that the risk
minimization in (13) has a closed form solution, and each risk measure is translated to a simple
dual price updating rule. As the result, impressions can be allocated in realtime without heavy
computations.
Recall that when the h-th impression is received, we assign it to an advertiser to minimize the risk
measure in (6), or equivalently, maximize instantaneous revenue,
∑
i rjixji, plus a value function,∑
i vi(si), that controls overspending of advertisers. Here, variable si represents the remaining bud-
get of the i-th advertiser after assigning the h-th impression. Thus, we precisely solve optimization
problem (13) upon arrival of the h-th impression.
The solution to optimization problem (13) can be characterized by its Lagrange function.
L(xhi, si) =
∑
i
rhixhi +
∑
i
νi(bi− bh−1i − ahixhi) +λ(
∑
i
xhi− 1).
In any optimal solution, we should have ∂L
∂xhi
≥ 0.
∂L
∂xhi
= rhi + ν
′
i(bi− bh−1i − ahixhi))× (−ahi) +λ.
Assume x∗h is an optimal solution. If x
∗
hi > 0 then
∂L
∂xhi
= 0, and therefore,
i∈ argmaxk rhk + ν ′i(bk− bh−1k − ahkxhk)× (−ahk).
If maxk rhk + ν
′
i(bk − bh−1k − ahkxhk)× (−ahk)≤ 0 then we will not allocate the impression to any
advertiser and xˆhi = 0 for all i. However, in practice, ad networks often have a house campaign with
an infinite budget and very small revenues (rji). Thus, maxk rhk + ν
′
i(bk − bh−1k − ahkxhk)× (−ahk)
is always positive in practice.
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Next, we find closed form solutions for the four budget value functions that are discussed in
Section 4. In all cases, the allocation algorithm is equivalent to a simple price updating scheme.
Zero Value Function (greedy): In this case we choose vi(si) = 0 for all i, so that the allocation
algorithm would reduce to the greedy algorithm. Upon arrival of the h-th impression request, it
would be allocated to the i∗-th advertiser according to (break ties arbitrarily)
i∗ ∈ argmaxi rhi (24)
s.t. bh−1i + ahi ≤ bi, i= 1,2, . . . ,M. (25)
Set xˆhi∗ = 1 and xˆhi = 0 for i 6= i∗.
Linear Value Function (fixed dual): This is the case we choose vi(si) = p

isi for all i, so that
the allocation algorithm would be equivalent to the dual-based algorithm proposed in Agrawal
et al. (2009).
i∗ ∈ argmaxi rhi− piahi (26)
s.t. bh−1i + ahi ≤ bi, i= 1,2, . . . ,N. (27)
Effectively, the dual price of the ith advertiser is fixed.
Log Value Function (log): This is the case we choose vi(si) = p

isi +γ log
(
si
bi
)
. Since v′i(si) =
pi +
γ
si
, the allocation algorithm would be
i∗ ∈ argmaxi rhi− piahi− γ
ahi
si
(28)
s.t. bh−1i + ahi + si = bi, i= 1,2, . . . ,M. (29)
si ≥ 0. (30)
Effectively, the dual price of the ith advertiser is dynamically adjusted to pi +
γ
si
.
Exponential Value Function (exponential): This is the case we choose
vi(si) = p

i
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
,
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so that the allocation algorithm would be
i∗ ∈ argmaxi rhi− piahieκ(
bi−si
bi
− hN ) (31)
s.t. bh−1i + ahi + si = bi, i= 1,2, . . . ,M.
si ≥ 0.
Effectively, the dual price of the ith advertiser is dynamically adjusted to pie
κ(
bi−si
bi
− hN ).
6. Experimental Results
While online resource allocation is widely studied under various theoretical assumptions, the per-
formance of these proposed methods is not comprehensively analyzed with real data. We used
allocation algorithms discussed in Section 5 for the revenue maximization in the display advertis-
ing where billions of impressions are served every day. First, in Section 6.1 we describe the data
structure and characteristics. In Section 6.2 we discuss dual prices estimation using the previously
observed data. Next, the performance of various allocation algorithms is presented in Section 6.3.
As mentioned before, usually advertisers enforce some restrictions on the number of served ads to
a particular user (frequency capping). In Section 6.4, we extend the framework to accommodate
ad serving under frequency capping constraints.
6.1. Data and Experiment Setting
We used AOL/Advertising.com impression logs to evaluate the performance of the proposed price
updating algorithms. The data set includes about 200 million impressions that were served on
October 11, 2013 between 10 am and 12 am. We restrict this study to 700 advertisers (campaigns)
with limited budgets. Impressions were divided into two subsets:
T1 : Impressions which were served between 10 am- 11 am.
T2 : Impressions which were served between 11 am- 12 am.
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Impressions in T1 were used for learning initial dual prices in equation (2), and impressions in time
period T2 were used for evaluation.
Note that there are around 100 million impressions in T1, and that it is not possible to incorporate
all impressions in the LP solver (equation (2)). If we have M impressions, then the number of
constraints in LP would be M +N (N=700) and the number of variables would be MN . With
millions of impressions, the LP size is too large for the solver to handle. Thus, we sample impressions
in T1 with the rate of δ which generates a smaller LP.
Non-zero Bids of Each Advertiser: When an impression request arrives, many advertisers
submit zero value for the impression. This can be due to a number of factors such as geographic
targeting, or audience targeting. For example, a campaign might be promoting a particular product
to female users in the US with an income of more than $100k. Thus, the advertiser assigns zero
value for most of the impressions as he/she only values the narrow subset of impressions coming
from the target group.
Figure 3 is the distribution of advertisers based on the submitted non-zero bids for about 910k
impressions. As one can see, many advertisers (more than 170 out of 700) submit less than 50k
bids. These advertisers are targeting a very specific group of Internet users.
Non-zero Bids of Each Impression: Narrow targeting can also be observed by focusing on
the number of non-zero bids for each impression. Figure 4 shows frequency of impressions based
on submitted bids (non-zero). As one can see in the figure, there is no impression that is valued by
more than 450 advertisers. Indeed, almost all of the impressions receive less than 400 (out of 700)
non-zero bids, and almost half of the impressions receive less than 200 bids.
Figures 3 and 4 show that the initial LP problem is sparse. Some advertisers are only interested
in a very small fraction of the impressions. Generally, it is much harder to allocate the budget of
these narrowly targeted advertisers efficiently.
LP solver: We used MOSEK as the LP solver in phase 1 for estimating dual prices from
impressions in T1. Constraining the running time to less than 1.5 hours, and using a machine with
an Intel Core i7 processor and 8G of RAM, we could solve instances of the problem with up to 52k
impressions.
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6.2. Estimating Dual Prices in the Initial Phase
Since initial dual prices pi, i= 1,2, . . . ,N , are estimated from a subset of impressions in T1, esti-
mated dual prices depend on a randomly selected subset of impressions. As you may expect, the
stability of estimated dual prices is a key factor in the performance of the allocation algorithms.
Here, we show how dual prices are impacted as we add more impressions to the LP in equation
(2).
In order to study the volatility of dual prices, the set of impressions in T1 is permuted randomly,
and then LP is solved using the first Ml impressions in the permuted set. Figure 5 compares
dual prices that are computed using a different number of impressions. In the top left figure,
we compare dual prices computed using Ml = 100 impressions versus dual prices computed using
Ml = 200 impressions. Note that the set of Ml = 200 impressions is obtained by appending 100
randomly-selected impressions to the initial 100 impressions. Thus, the two sets of impressions
are not independent. The size of each point is proportional to logKi, where Ki is the number of
non-zero bids of the i-th advertiser. Smaller points correspond to advertisers with a small number
of non-zero bids, and it is typically harder to find their dual prices.
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Figure 5 Dual prices from different sets of impressions. Top left: dual prices after 100 impressions vs 200 impres-
sions. Top right: dual prices after 800 impressions vs 1600 impressions. Bottom left: dual prices after 6400
impressions vs 12800 impressions. Bottom right: dual prices after 204800 impressions vs 409600 impres-
sions. Note that the size of each point is proportional to log (number of non-zero bids of the advertiser).
The top right figure represents dual prices at Ml = 800 versus Ml = 1600, and down left figure
represents dual prices at Ml = 6,400 versus Ml = 12,800. Finally, the down left plot in Figure
5 compares dual prices at Ml = 204,800 and Ml = 409,600. It is important to note that using
MOSEK, we could only include at most 52k impressions in the LP (to be solved in less than 1.5
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hours). In the case of Ml > 52k, we just used the last 52k impressions. As a result, in contrast to
the first three figures, impression sets in the last figure are disjointed.
As the number of impressions are increased in the LP, most of the dual prices converge. That
is, they have the same value for the two different impression sets. However, for some advertisers,
dual prices can be significantly different in two samples, i.e., the representing points in Figure 5
are far from the identity line. Even in the last plot (bottom left), which includes the most number
of impressions from T1, there are many advertisers whose dual prices are zero in one sample and
significant in the other sample. This observation indicates that using static dual prices for time
T2 can result in an unbalanced budget consumption for some advertisers. As one might expect,
dynamic adjustment of dual prices in log value and exponential value can mitigate the effect of
unstable dual prices. We will discuss this effect in more detail in the next section.
6.3. Performance of Proposed Allocation Algorithms
Ad networks usually have two criteria for the performance of an allocation algorithm that are
closely connected. The first criterion is the total collected revenue as discussed earlier. Indeed, we
only used revenue criterion to formulate and study the problem of display advertising allocation. In
addition to the revenue performance, advertisers require their budget to be spent evenly. Typically,
it is not desirable to exhaust the budget of an advertiser long before the end of the day. Using real
data, we demonstrate how various value functions perform under these metrics.
We formulated the display advertising allocation as a linear programming problem with the total
revenue as the objective function (equation (1)). Figure 6 shows the total collected revenue of four
allocation algorithms as they progress. The greedy algorithm, as the name suggests, is greedy in
collecting revenue at the beginning; however, soon fails to keep pace and total revenue starts to
saturate. Using fixed duals for allocation, based on equation (19), would regularize bids and result
in a higher revenue. Note that dual prices are estimated from the previous data points (T1) and that
they don’t totally fit the new data set T2. The next allocation method is based on log value function
(21); the total revenue is less than fixed duals and more than greedy. As we will discuss later, log
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Figure 6 The total revenue of four allocation algorithms. Greedy algorithm generates high revenue at the begin-
ning and saturates very fast. While performance of fixed dual prices is reasonable, log value is over-
conservative in preserving resources. Allocation corresponding to the exponential value function achieves
the highest revenue and smooth spending.
value induces an overly conservative allocation method, and does not spend the advertiser’s total
budget. Finally, we have exponential value function which has the highest revenue. This method
uses estimated dual prices and keeps updating them according to the served impressions. Table 1
contains performance metrics of four algorithms. The total revenue of the exponential allocation
is 11.6% better than the greedy algorithm.
In addition to the revenue, balanced budget delivery is regarded critical for advertisers and ad
networks. Advertisers prefer to reach their audiences regularly during the flight of a campaign rather
than run out of budget early before the end. The number of campaigns which are out of budget
(oob) for the four discussed allocation algorithms are shown in Figure 7. Greedy allocation assigns
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Figure 7 The total number of campaigns with exhausted budget vs the number of served impressions. In both
greedy and fixed dual, advertisers start to exhaust their budget from the beginning of the experiment.
In contrast, log value and exponential value allocations keep advertisers in budget until the very end.
each impression to the advertiser with the highest immediate revenue. Therefore, as expected, the
greedy algorithm aggressively exhausts budgets of campaigns with higher revenue. As you can see
in Table 1, by mid flight, 366 campaigns would be out of budget (oob) using greedy allocation.
Discounting bids of advertisers with dual prices not only improves the total allocation revenue
but it also results in an smoother delivery. If an advertiser with a limited budget has a high
value for most impressions, then its associated dual price would be high and thus regularized bids,
rji − piaji, would be much smaller. Therefore, the advertiser would get less impressions and its
budget is conserved during the flight. Using dual prices, the number of campaigns with no budget
(oob) is 192 in mid flight compared to 366 oob campaigns in greedy (Table 1).
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Table 1 Performance of allocation algorithms.
Allocation Total Revenue Improvement Mid flight oob Final oob
algorithm over greedy
Greedy $1829.94 - 366 467
Fixed dual $1986.67 8.5% 192 452
Log $1915.72 4.6% 5 71
Exponential $2043.21 11.6% 7 476
The last two allocation algorithms, log value and exponential value, ensure a very smooth deliv-
ery. Log value function, in equation (21), highly penalizes bids of advertisers with small remaining
budgets. Thus, as it is clear from Figure 7 and Table 1, most of the advertisers stay in budget
during the flight. This results in an overly conservative allocation algorithm. Even at the end of
the experiment, there are only 71 campaigns with no budget, which is not desirable in terms of
the total revenue.
The exponential value function has the best balance between attaining the highest revenue
and smooth delivery. As one can see in Table 1, while it has the highest total revenue (11.6%
improvement over greedy), most of the advertisers are in budget during the flight. It is only at
the end of the flight that exponential value starts to exhaust budgets of advertisers, which is a
desirable behavior.
To test robustness of the algorithms further, we applied four allocation algorithms to the stream
of the impressions in the reverse order as well. Impressions are fed into the algorithms from last
to first, and the results are shown in Table 2. Performance metrics are very similar to what we
observed in the natural order of impressions.
6.4. Enforcing Frequency Caps (Fcap)
Showing a particular ad to one user multiple times might be less effective than showing the same
number of ads to many distinct users. Thus, advertisers typically enforce some frequency caps
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Table 2 Performance of allocation algorithms for the reverse impression stream.
Allocation Total Revenue Improvement Mid flight oob Final oob
algorithm over greedy
Greedy $1828.34 - 380 467
Fixed dual $1988.09 8.7% 214 455
Log $1916.11 4.8% 8 68
Exponential $2044.02 11.7% 8 473
for showing a specific ad to one user. For example, they may require that each user is served a
particular ad at most two times per 24 hours. In this section, we extend the proposed methods to
be able to handle frequency capping.
Frequency capping can be enforced in various ways. In most cases, advertisers restrict the ad
network to show at most f ads in each h hours. For simplicity, assume, for the given time period
that we could serve at most fi ads from the i-th advertiser to each user. If Iu is the set of impressions
from user u, then we can solve the following the linear optimization problem to estimate dual prices
in phase 1.
max
M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
rjixji (32)
s.t.
∑
j
ajixji ≤ bi∑
j∈Iu
xji ≤ fi ∀u∈ 1,2 . . . ,U ∀i∈ 1,2, . . . ,N (33)∑
i
xji ≤ 1, xji ≥ 0
However, adding frequency capping constraints (33) to the LP formulation is not practical. If
we have U users, we should add one constraint per user per advertiser. Thus, we should add UN
new constraints to the original LP. The number of users, U , is usually very large and proportional
to the number of impressions M . Current commercial LP solvers wouldn’t be able to solve it in a
reasonable time (e.g. less than 1.5 hours in our application) with tens of thousands of impressions.
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In order to reduce the computation complexity of the LP in (32), we relax the LP (32) to
reduce the number of constraints while frequency caps constraints are approximately enforced.
For advertiser i, let Pi be a partition over impressions with non-zero bids. Instead of enforcing a
user-based frequency cap, we establish a frequency limit on each partition. In other words, for each
set P ∈Pi, we compute an upper bound, f(i,P ), for the number of impressions that can be served
to the particular set P .
f(i,P ) = max |S| (34)
s.t. S ⊂ P,∑
j∈Iu∩S
xji ≤ fi u= 1,2, . . . ,U,
where |.| is the size of set S. Note that in this optimization problem, we want to find the maximum
number of impressions from set P that can be assigned to an advertiser while frequency caps are
satisfied. Since constraints are on individual users, the optimal value, f(i,P ), can be computed in
O(|P |).
Finally, we can replace the user based frequency capping constraints in problem (32) with par-
tition based frequency caps.
max
M∑
j=1
∑
i
rjixji (35)
s.t.
∑
j
ajixji ≤ bi ,∑
j∈Pi
xji ≤ f(i,Pi) ∀Pi ∈Pi ∀i∈ 1,2, . . . ,N,∑
i
xji ≤ 1, xji ≥ 0.
In this formulation, the number of constraints is increased by
∑
i |Pi| which can be kept constant
independent of the number of impressions and users.
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Figure 8 Revenue under fcap constraints.
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Figure 9 Number of campaigns with no budget under
fcap constraints.
Table 3 Performance of allocation algorithms with Fcap.
Allocation Total Revenue Improvement Mid flight oob Final oob
algorithm over greedy
Greedy $1531.71 0.0% 335 411
Fixed dual $1548.32 1.08% 232 357
Log $1511.20 -1.3% 6 39
Exponential $1694.89 10.6% 5 333
Similar to Figures 6 and 7, revenue and budget delivery of the four allocation algorithms are
represented in Figures 8 and 9. For this experiment, we have used 10 quintiles of non-zero bids of
each advertiser as a partition on bids. Again, exponential value allocation gives the best revenue and
most balanced delivery. Because of using partitions instead of actual frequency capping constraints,
estimated dual prices are less accurate. Thus, it is not a surprise to observe a smaller improvement
over greedy in the dual price allocation algorithm.
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7. Conclusion, Discussion, and Future Work
In this paper, we developed dual price updating rules that incorporate the belief of the ad network
toward the future demand. We modeled the impression allocation problem as a convex risk mini-
mization problem, and impressions are allocated such that the exposed risk is minimized. Such a
convex representation leads us to build a connection between the belief of the ad network toward
the future demand and dual price updating rules. Price updating rules have simple representations
in terms of the remaining budgets, and they can be implemented in a real ad network with billions
of impressions served per day. The proposed allocation algorithms are evaluated for a real data
set from AOL/Advertising.com. We empirically showed that the exponential updating rule has the
best performance in terms of the total collected revenue and the smooth budget consumption.
Even though the empirical results are presented by applying the algorithms in two consequent
time periods (T1 and T2), they can be extended to a rolling horizon scheme. In Section 6, initial dual
prices are estimated using a sample of impressions from the first time period (T1). The estimated
dual prices are used in the second time period T2 to evaluate the performance. However, when
there are d time periods, T1, T2 . . . Td, the allocation algorithm in each time period utilizes the dual
prices that are obtained from the pervious time period.
One direction for future work is addressing the delay in the observation of revenue and cost
information. In practice, a time delay in observing the total exhausted budget or the collected
revenue is inevitable. This can be due to the nature of the revenue model, or it can be due to
technological limitations. We observed that the pro- posed algorithms are very sensitive to the
delay, and their performance degrades considerably by introducing even a small amount of delay.
In summary, we proposed simple price updating rules that minimized the ex- posed risk to the
ad network. These updating rules perform well on real data sets without assuming any structure
on the sequence of impression arrivals.
Appendix A: Monotonicity of θ(.)
Lemma 6. If ∀s > 0, ∂vi
∂s
(s)≤ pmax then
XS ≥XS¯ ⇒ θ(XS)≤ θ(XS¯).
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Proof For all p∈Ω, XS(p)≥XS¯(p), or equivalently,
w+
N∑
i=1
pisi ≥ w¯+
N∑
i=1
pis¯i, (36)
w− w¯ ≥
N∑
i=1
pi(s¯i− si). (37)
On the other hand,
θ(XS¯)− θ(XS) = −w¯+w+
N∑
i=1
vi(si)− vi(s¯i) (38)
= −w¯+w+
N∑
i=1
∂vi
∂s
(sˆi)(si− s¯i),
where s¯i is a real value between si and s¯i. Since equation (37) is satisfied for all 0 ≤ pi ≤ pmax,
from equations (37) and (38), we can conclude that θ(XS¯)− θ(XS)≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 4
Using Theorem 4.30 in Fo¨llmera and Schied (2004), we just need to show ρ(.) is continuous from
above, i.e.,
Xn↘X =⇒ ρ(Xn)↗ ρ(X).
Assume Xn↘X. By the monotonicity property of the risk measure ρ(.),
ρ(X)≥ ρ(Xn+1)≥ ρ(Xn).
Thus, ρ(X)≥ lim
n→+∞
ρ(Xn).
For every ≥ 0, and for every n, there exists XSn ∈ Xˆ such that
XSn ≤Xn, (39)
θ(XSn)≤ ρ(Xn) + . (40)
Consider sequence {Sn}i. Since 0≤XSn ≤Xn ≤X1 and X1 is bounded by definition, this sequence
is bounded in IRM+1. Thus there is a subsequence {Sn′} that converge to a point S∗. Since XSn′ ≤
Xn′ ,
XS∗ = lim
n′→+∞
XSn′ ≤ limn′→+∞Xn′ =X.
Since vi(.) are continuous, thereby,
ρ(X)≤ θ(XS∗)≤ lim
n→+∞
ρ(Xn) + . (41)
Since equation (41) is valid for every  > 0, ρ(X)≤ lim
n→+∞
ρ(Xn), and consequently,
ρ(X) = lim
n→+∞
ρ(Xn).
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Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 5
Recall, by Lemma 4, α(Q) can be restated by
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
EQ[−X]− ρ(X). (42)
First, we show that, in the above representation, taking supremum over Xˆ is equivalent of taking
supremum over X . Fix a positive real value  > 0. By the definition of risk measure (5), for every
X ∈X , there exists XS(∈ Xˆ )≤X such that
ρ(X)≤ θ(XS) = ρ(XS) ≤ ρ(X) + . (43)
Therefore,
EQ[−X]− ρ(X)≤EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS) + .
Hence,
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
EQ[−X]− ρ(X)
≤ sup
XS∈Xˆ
EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS) + . (44)
Since equation (44) is valid for every  > 0, thus
α(Q) ≤ sup
XS∈Xˆ
EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS). (45)
On the other hand, since Xˆ ⊂ X
sup
XS∈Xˆ
EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS) ≤ α(Q). (46)
Therefore, from (45) and (46)
α(Q) = sup
XS∈Xˆ
EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS). (47)
Next, observe
EQ[−XS] = EQ[−w−
N∑
i=1
pisi] (48)
= −w−
N∑
i=1
EQ[pi]si (49)
= −w−
N∑
i=1
p∗i si. (50)
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And finally, since ρ(XS) =−w−
∑N
i=1 vi(si),
α(Q) = sup
XS∈Xˆ
EQ[−XS]− ρ(XS)
= sup
XS∈Xˆ
−
N∑
i=1
p∗i si +
N∑
i=1
vi(si)
= sup
XS∈Xˆ
N∑
i=1
(
vi(si)− p∗i si
)
. (51)
Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Logarithmic Risk Measure
In this appendix, we compute probability penalty function α(Q) for risk measure in (6) when
vi(si) = p

isi + γ log
(
si
bi
)
.
Substituting vi(si) in (17), we have
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
N∑
i=1
(
pisi + γ log
(
si
bi
)
− p∗i si
)
. (52)
Note that since sis are independent, each term of equation (52) can be maximized separately. Let
βi(si) = p

isi + γ log
(
si
bi
)
− p∗i si. Then,
∂βi
∂si
= pi +
γ
si
− p∗i , (53)
and
∂2βi
∂s2i
=− γ
s2i
< 0. (54)
Since the second derivative is negative, βi(si) achieves its maximum when βi(si) = 0, or on the
boundaries. There are two cases.
(a) If bi(p
∗
i − pi)≤ γ then ∂βi∂si ≤ 0 and βi(si) achieves its maximum on the boundary s∗i = bi.
(b) If bi(p
∗
i − pi)>γ function βi(si) is maximized at point s∗i where ∂βi∂si (s∗i ) = 0, or equivalently,
p∗i = p

i +
γ
s∗i
, (55)
s∗i =
γ
p∗i − pi
. (56)
Combining (a) and (b), βi(si) is maximized at
s∗i =
{
bi bi(p
∗
i − pi)≤ γ
γ
p∗i−pi
o.w.
Shamsi et al.: Online Allocation Rules in Display Advertising
40 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!)
If bi(p
∗
i − pi)≤ γ,
max
si
βi(si) = bip

i − bip∗i .
If bi(p
∗
i − pi)>γ,
max
si
βi(si) = p

is
∗
i + γ log
(
s∗i
bi
)
− p∗i s∗i (57)
= pi
γ
p∗i − pi
+ γ log
( γ
p∗i−pi
bi
)
− p∗i
γ
p∗i − pi
(58)
= −γ+ γ log
(
γ
bip∗i − bipi
)
. (59)
Or,
α(Q) =
∑
βi(si) = ‖p.b−p∗.b‖λ,
where function ‖x‖λ is defined in (22).
Appendix E: Exponential Risk Measure
Here we derive the probability penalty function for the exponential risk measure. In the exponential
risk measure, the budget value function, vi(.), is defined as follows.
vi(si) = p

i
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
.
By Lemma 5,
α(Q) = sup
X∈X
N∑
i=1
(
pi
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
− p∗i si
)
. (60)
Similar to the previous risk measures, each term in (60) can be maximized independently. Let
αi(si) = p

i
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
− p∗i si. (61)
In order to find the optimal solution, we the find first and the second derivative of αi(si).
∂αi
∂si
= pie
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
− p∗i . (62)
∂2αi
∂s2i
= pi
(
− κ
bi
)
e
k
(
bi−si
bi
− hN
)
< 0. (63)
Since the second derivative is negative, αi(si) attains its maximum where
∂αi
∂si
(s∗i ) = 0 or on the
boundaries. Thus,
p∗i = p

ie
κ
(
bi−s∗i
bi
− hN
)
(64)
p∗i
pi
= e
κ
(
bi−s∗i
bi
− hN
)
(65)
s∗i = bi
(
1− 1
κ
log
(
p∗i
pi
)
− h
N
)
. (66)
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Substituting s∗i in equation (61),
αi(s
∗
i ) = p

i
(
−bi
κ
)
e
k
(
bi−s∗i
bi
− hN
)
− p∗i s∗i (67)
= pi
(
−bi
κ
)
p∗i
pi
− p∗i bi
(
1− 1
κ
log
(
p∗i
pi
)
− h
N
)
(68)
= p∗i bi
(
−1
κ
− 1 + 1
κ
log
(
p∗i
pi
)
+
h
N
)
. (69)
Finally, the probability penalty function α(Q) can be represented by KL-divergence as follows.
α(Q) =
N∑
i=1
αi(s
∗
i ) (70)
=
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi
(
−1
κ
− 1 + 1
κ
log
(
p∗i
pi
)
+
h
N
)
(71)
=
(
−1
κ
− 1 + h
N
) N∑
i=1
p∗i bi +
1
κ
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi
(
log
(
p∗i
pi
))
(72)
=
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi
(
−1
κ
− 1 + h
N
+
1
κ
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi∑N
j=1 p
∗
jbj
log
(
p∗i bi
pibi
))
(73)
=
(
N∑
i=1
p∗i bi
)(
−
(
1− h
N
)
+
1
κ
(
DKL (p.b‖p∗.b)− 1
))
. (74)
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